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1. INTRODUCTION
The history of textiles and apparel trade in the global system
evidences the persistent institutionalization of protectionist poli-
cies, despite the principal purpose of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") of moving the global trading system
towards liberalized trade. The textiles and apparel industry has
stood as an exception to GATT principles, although currently, un-
der the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing ("ATC') negotiated
under the 1994 Uruguay Round, the Multi-Fiber Arrangement
("MFA"), the regime regulating this sector through unilateral and
bilateral quantitative restrictions, is to be phased out by 2005.
But decisive steps toward liberalization are not apparent from
the continued protectionism on the part of the developed import-
ing countries of the European Union and the United States. In-
deed, even as the 2005 deadline for phasing out quantitative re-
strictions approaches, Europe and the United States have not taken
any positive steps toward dismantling the protectionist regime that
has been in place since the 1960s. History shows that each agree-
ment renewing the protectionist agenda since the 1960s had ini-
tially been purported to be "temporary." However, the past four
decades of protectionism in the textiles and apparel trade cast into
doubt the commitment of developed importing countries to inte-
grate this sector under GATT's auspices.
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The textiles and apparel' industry in the United States and in
the European Union has received special treatment in the form of
extensive and prolonged protectionist government policies and
agreements among members of the international community to re-
strict textiles and apparel trade since the late 1950s. As one author
notes, "[p]erhaps in no other sector of postwar trade, save agri-
culture, have such persistent cries for protection been raised."2
Although the Multi-Fiber Arrangement,3 the complex global re-
gime of restrictions that has governed the textiles and apparel
trade since 1961, is scheduled to be dismantled by 2005, textiles
and apparel trade from exporting developed countries remains the
most tightly regulated in any manufacturing sector.4
A central criticism of the persistence of multilateral restraints
on textiles and apparel trade has been that the policies governing it
have been at odds with the central principles underlying GATT,
whose "purpose has been to promote a free and orderly trading
system." 6 Specifically, the restrictions on the textile imports are in
contradiction with the basic principles of GATT: nondiscrimina-
tion through Most-Favored Nation ("MFN") treatment7 and the
1 Dr. Kitty G. Dickerson notes that the term "textiles" includes both textile
products and apparel in trade terminology; in technical terminology, "textiles" is
defined in the Standard International Trade Classification 65 ('SITC"), and in-
cludes "textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles not elsewhere specified, and related
products"; "apparel" is defined in SITC 84. See Kitty G. Dickerson, Textile Trade.
The GATT Exception, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 393, 393 rL1 (1996); see also
Jared L. Landaw, Note, Textile and Apparel Trade Liberalization: The Need for a Stra-
tegic Change in Free Trade Arguments, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 205, 205 n.1
("'[a]pparel' is generally defined as clothing products and various clothing acces-
sories.").
2 Gary H. Perlow, The Multilateral Supervision of International Trade: Has the
Textiles Experiment Worked?, 75 AMER. J. INT'L L 93, 93 (1981).
3 See Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, MULTILATERAL
AGREEMENTS ON TRADE IN GOODS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEcTS 85, art. 2(8) [hereinafter
ATC].
4 See Craig R. Giesse & Martin J. Lewin, The Multifihier Arrangement: "Tempo-
rary" Protection Run Amuck, 19 L & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 51, 55 (1987).
5 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
6 Landaw, supra note 1, at 206.
7 See GATT, supra note 5, art. I, para 1. Article I of the GATT provides:
1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or
in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the inter-
national transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to
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general proscription against quantitative restraints.8 Nevertheless,
in the area of textiles and apparel trade, importing countries have
legitimated the departure from GATT principles in the form of
trade-restricting agreements on the assertion that the future of lib-
eralized trade would be enhanced if "exceptions" to the GATT
principles of non-discrimination and the general prohibition on
quantitative restrictions were made in an "officially authorized and
controlled manner."9 However, by prolonging the liberalization of
trade, the importing countries have prevented exporting countries
from fully realizing their comparative advantage in textiles and
apparel trade.10
Issues over the form and content of law governing the trade of
apparel and textiles have held widely disparate implications for
the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all
rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation,
and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Arti-
de I, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like
product originating in or destined for the territories of all other con-
tracting parties.
Id.
s The general prohibition against quantitative restraints under GATT is
stated as follows.
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges,
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or
other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting
party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other
contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product
destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
GATT, supra note 5, art. XI, para. 1.
The general proscription against quantitative restraints under GATT applies
in the absence of an applicable exception thereto. Such exceptions cover, for ex-
ample, temporary export prohibitions or restrictions "to prevent or relieve critical
shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting
party." GATT, supra note 5, art. Xl, para. 2. Furthermore, the GATT authorizes an
importing country that is experiencing a balance-of-payments crisis to impose
quotas in order to safeguard its external financial position and its balance of pay-
ments. Id. art. XIL See also Giesse & Lewin, srqra note 4, at 52 r.3.
9 Landaw, supra note 1, at 206-07.
30 See generally WiwAM R CLNE, THE FUTURE OF WORLD TRADE IN TEXTJLEs
AND APPAREL 138-43 (1987) (examining the evolving comparative advantage
among developing countries and concluding that it is not clear that a regime of
protected textiles and apparel trade is either the most equitable or the most effi-
cient).
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developing and industrialized nations, where developing countries
are generally the primary exporters, and industrialized countries
the importers. As the 1999 Seattle Ministerial meeting of the World
Trade Organization ("WTO") illustrates, the focus of the industri-
alized countries, in particular the United States and the European
Union," has been on targeting further areas of trade liberalization,
whereas developing countries, such as India, have sought a "re-
dressal of problems" that have grown out of the 1994 Uruguay
Round.12 The demands on the part of developing countries, in-
cluding India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Egypt, and Cuba, are
for a "more meaningful liberalisation in products and markets of
interest to them and for incorporating the requirements of devel-
opment into the existing agreements." 13 Specifically, these coun-
tries have argued that there is a disparity between the new obliga-
tions that the developing countries have had to take on at the WTO
and the rights that they were promised.14
11 This Comment discusses both the European and the United States roles in
shaping textiles trade agreements with developing exporting countries, with a
primary focus on the U.S. market. It is important to acknowledge that the Euro-
pean community continues to play a vital role in the parameters of trade policy in
this sector. Alternatively, the interest of the United States in protecting its do-
mestic industry has not been the sole basis for the restrictive trade agreements.
The very nature of the debate over textiles and apparel trade mandates a full dis-
cussion of all interested countries, as the interdependence and diversionary effects
of such trade agreements impact even those countries that are not party to the
agreements. As will be discussed later in this Comment, the fact that a country is
not a party to agreements restricting textile and apparel trade becomes a matter of
utmost relevance to the debate: since investors in countries that are subject to such
restrictions are able to relocate to a country where there are no such barriers to
entry into an importing country, it is relevant to discuss countries that seemingly
stand beyond any trade restriction.
12 Implementation Imbalances at TO, HINDU, Nov. 17, 1999 at 25 [hereinafter
Implementation Imbalances].
13 Id.
14 See id. (noting that in the agreement on the trade-related aspects of intel-
lectual property rights (TRIPs), developing countries were to provide stricter
protection to patents, but developed countries did not agree to transfer technol-
ogy). Developing countries have raised the issue of the western countries press-
ing for negotiations about liberalizing trade in services, protecting intellectual
property rights, and lowering barriers to direct investment, while not lifting re-
strictions on textile imports. See Multi-fibre Arrangement: Tit for GAYT, ECONOMIST,
July 26,1986, at 60 [hereinafter Tit for GATI]. Even in 1986, at preliminary GAIT
negotiations on the new Round's agenda, developing countries had stressed that
their consideration of these proposed negotiations by the United States and its
western allies "depend on the easing of controls on textiles as a token of good
faith." Id.
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The developing countries argue that trade liberalization has not
taken place in the sectors of importance to them, such as in tex-
tiles.15 Although the developed countries agreed in the Uruguay
Round to remove existing barriers to textiles imports, developing
countries, such as India, have asserted that the developed countries
have fulfilled the agreement more in letter than in spirit, because
most of the items that have been integrated into the GATT system
had not been previously restricted anyway. 6 From the perspective
of the developing countries, imbalances in competition between
developing and developed countries have only been reinforced,
due to the developed countries' restrictive implementation of trade
agreements in the textiles and apparel sector under the Uruguay
Round, coupled with the extensive use of trade remedies. 7
On the other hand, countries in the Caribbean and in Latin
America, as well as in Russia, do not face such restrictions on ex-
ports to the United States. Thus, manufacturers from exporting
countries subject to these restrictions continue to relocate their
production to unrestricted areas in order to circumvent importing
countries' trade restrictions against them. As a result, the presence
of U.S. quotas on textiles and apparel has not prevented exporters,
such as Korean manufacturers, from finding alternative means of
entry into the U.S. market,'s thus rendering the quotas less effec-
tive. Furthermore, these quotas, in direct contradiction with GATT
principles, diminish the efficiency of not merely the global market,
but the U.S. domestic market as well.
This Comment seeks to show how U.S. quotas meet neither the
stated goal of moving cautiously towards integration of textiles
and apparel under the liberal principles of GATT, nor satisfy the
interest of the U.S. domestic industry in preventing competitive
imports from entering its market Section 2 provides a brief sketch
of the U.S. textiles and apparel industry as a significant impetus for
the U.S. policy of maintaining and even expanding trade protection
15 Implementation Imbalances, supra note 12 For example, India's textile ex-
ports constitute more that twenty percent of its total exports. See Al R Dizon,
ASEAN Watch: Uruguay Round Pledges and New Trade Talks, Bus. WoRLD (Philip-
pines), Dec. 3,1999, at 2 [hereinafter ASEAN Watch].
16 Ashish Gupta, India to Press for Expanded Textile List at Seattle, STATESMAN
(India), Nov. 13,1999.
17 See ASEAN Watch, supra note 15.
IS Russell Working, Russia's Patchwork Economy Korean Companies, Chine
Workers and U.S. Entr&, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,1999, at C1.
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in this sector. Sections 3 and 4 provide the historical background
behind U.S. protection of the textiles and apparel industry, and
show how protectionism in this sector has developed into a debate
along north-south lines. Section 5 explores the agreements gov-
erning trade in textiles and apparel, such as the Multi-Fiber Ar-
rangement, as departures from the fundamental GATT principles
of MFN treatment and the general prohibition against quantitative
restrictions. It looks at the current regime under the Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing and its adjudicatory institution, the Textiles
Monitoring Body ("TMB"), and asks whether such a system is ef-
fective both in bringing textiles under the auspices of GATT and
protecting less competitive countries, such as the United States,
prior to the planned liberalization. Section 6 examines how U.S.
quotas have impacted Japanese and Korean importers who have
been able to circumvent the quotas by operating manufacturing fa-
cilities in regions that are not subject to such restrictions. Section 7
presents the argument that U.S. quotas are not necessarily effective
in keeping imports out of the market, and that they are economi-
cally inefficient for U.S. industry.
2. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR U.S. PROTECTIONISM OF TEXTILE AND
APPAREL TRADE: § 204 OF THE U.S. AGRICULTURAL ACT
In 1956, the United States formalized its protection against low-
cost textile imports from developing countries by enacting § 204 of
the Agricultural Act.' 9 The provision authorizes the President to
negotiate agreements limiting textile imports into the United States
"whenever he determines such action appropriate," in order to
provide "relief" to domestic producers.20 It thereby gives signifi-
cant latitude to the Executive Branch to pursue agreements re-
stricting trade.
Significantly, the President's authority to negotiate textile re-
straint agreements has had its legal basis in an agricultural act
since the 1950S,21 when the primary textile fiber in use was cotton.22
Thus, it was appropriate that in 1956 when the provision was en-
acted, it would be covered under an agricultural act. However, §
19 U.S. Agricultural Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1854 (1988).
2o Id.
21 See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 403.
22 See id. (noting that in the 1950s, "[v]irtually all imported textile products
made of cotton were considered a threat.").
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204 was drafted to refer only to "textiles" or "textiles products,"
and thus covered all textiles, regardless of the fiber.23 Therefore, §
204 became a critical legal mechanism for permitting the United
States to impose restraints on all textile imports and provided the
legal basis for maintaining restrictions on textile imports of not
only cotton, but also of other fibers that had not previously been
restricted in any agreements with an importing country.24 The re-
sult has been the continued legal support for the expansion of re-
strictions on imports of fibers not previously covered as well as for
the imposition of restrictions on non-GATT members.
3. DOMESTIC POLITICS SHAPING THE PARAMETERS OF
U.S. APPAREL AND TEXTILES TRADE POLICY
Proponents of a liberalized textiles and apparel trade regime
assert that the economic condition of the U.S. textiles and apparel
industry does not satisfactorily justify its heightened and pro-
tracted protection.25 However, the U.S. textiles and apparel indus-
try has argued for protection against imports from developing
countries on the grounds that restricting imports from developing
countries prevents labor displacement in the industry26 and that
23 Id.
24 See id. ("[S]ection 204 was retained as the legal basis for restricting im-
ports, long after other fibers became equally important."). In the 1950s, the United
States sought to protect domestic industry primarily from cotton imports. With
new technology in synthetic fibers in the 1970s, however, the United States faced
increased imports made from these fibers, a product group that was not covered
under any agreement with an importing country. See discussion hifta Section 5.2.
Thus, the broad language of § 204 of the U.S. Agricultural Act provided a legal
basis for later restricting imports of other fibers. See id.
A further significance of § 204 of the Agricultural Act is that it authorizes the
President to restrict imports from countries that are not parties to a multilateral
textile agreement that covers "a significant part of world trade in textiles." See
U.S. Agricultural Act, supra note 19. Thus, by granting authority to the President
to regulate imports from nonparticipating countries, § 204 has become a way to
unilaterally impose quotas on products from countries, such as Taiwan, that are
not signatories to GATT-sponsored textiles agreements. See Dickerson, supira note
1, at 403 n.67.
25 See Giesse & Lewin, supra note 4, at 81 (noting that most sectors of the tex-
tiles and apparel industry were outperforming the U.S. economy in general).
26 See Federal Bureaucracy Running from Reality with Respect to International
Trade Issues: Hearings on H. 5321 Beore House, 99th Cong. (1986) (statement of Rep.
Gingrich) ("My understanding is, as has been reported by our very distinguished
leader in the fight for the survival of American jobs in the textile industry, that our
negotiators in Geneva once again caved in to pressure from foreign exporters and
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the U.S. textile and apparel industry is of critical importance to na-
tional security.27 The basic thrust of the arguments put forth by the
were apparently willing to continue sacrificing American jobs on the altar of free
trade."); Current Conditions in the Textile and Apparel Industries: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong. 100-104
(1985) [hereinafter Current Conditions] (statement of James H. Martin, Jr., Vice
Chairman, Ti-Caro, Inc., Gastonia, North Carolina and President, American Tex-
tile Manufacturers Institute) (attributing adverse conditions in the textiles indus-
try to textile imports); see also id. (statement of Ernest D. Marinai, Chairman, Pyke
Manufacturing Co.; Chairman, American Apparel Manufacturers Association)
(attributing problems in the textiles industry to a "flood of imports"). But see Gi-
esse & Lewin, supra note 4, at 58-62 (describing the arguments propounded by the
U.S. textiles and apparel lobby, and rejecting them on the grounds that they are
neither factually nor theoretically true).
27 Sen. Thurmond stated:
We simply cannot allow ourselves to become dependent upon foreign
nations for the basic defense requirements of our Armed Forces. While
the production of military apparel may come to mind first, the contribu-
tions of our domestic textile/apparel industry toward defense go far be-
yond fulfilling the basic necessity of clothing our fighting men. In World
War I, for example, the struggle to produce a manmade fiber, which we
know today as rayon, resulted in the discovery of a lacquer coating that
proved useful in the production of warplanes .... Previous testimony
before the Senate established that textiles rank second only to steel from
the standpoint of national defense.
131 CONG. REC S3077-06 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1985) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
See also The Textile and Apparel Trade Enforcement Act of 1985: Hearings on H. 1256,
99th Cong. (1985) (statement of Rep. Edward Jenkins) ("If import growth is not
slowed, future investment in this industry is likely to be sharply curtailed leading
to a loss in competitiveness and the continued liquidation of an industry which is
a major element of U.S. manufacturing and is recognized as vital to our national
security."). National security considerations do not necessarily warrant that an
entire industry be protected. See PAUL SAMUELSON, ECONoMICS 652 (11th ed. 1980)
("[S]elfish economic interests often.., try to justify uneconomic projects in terms
of national defense.").
Furthermore, an economic evaluation of the relationship between protection
and national security interests suggests that protection of the domestic textiles in-
dustry is not warranted:
The industrial applications subsector of the U.S. textile-mill sector is the
major supplier of textile products to the U.S. military. Import penetra-
tion levels in this subsector during the past few years have been only 4
percent per annum (citation omitted). Protecting the industrial-uses sub-
sector, therefore, apparently does not enhance the national security of the
United States. Only the U.S. apparel sector, which manufactures military
uniforms, might arguably warrant protection for national security rea-
sons. Yet, stockpiling measures appear to be a more efficient approach
than the erection of additional trade barriers to ensure a continued and
uninterrupted supply of military apparel (citation omitted).
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textiles and apparel lobby in favor of restricting imports is that the
U.S. domestic textiles and apparel industry would be put out of
business if trade barriers were lowered.8
However, these arguments lack factual or theoretical basis.
Although the proponents of import restrictions would assert that
the MFA has failed in its original intent of protecting the U.S. in-
dustry,29 others have argued that the MFA has in fact substantially
achieved "one of its original objectives by enabling the U.S. textile
and apparel industry to adjust gradually to changing patterns in
textile and apparel trade."30
Indeed, some scholars have noted that with technological ad-
vances and innovative product-sourcing and marketing strategies,
the U.S. domestic industry as a whole has grown healthier and is in
an advantageous position to compete effectively abroad.31 Thus, a
critical, yet often overlooked, component of the debate over the de-
sirability of continued U.S. protection of its textiles industry in-
cludes the "successful adjustment of the U.S. industry and its eco-
nomic vitality."32 The foregoing evaluation of U.S industrial
performance under the MFA suggests that U.S. industries would
no longer need protectionist barriers to trade in order to compete
effectively in the world market and that the argument that liberali-
zation would lead to the demise of the domestic textiles and ap-
parel industry would thereby fail.
However, rather than economic rationales forming the basis for
structuring trade policy, the political power of influential textiles
and apparel manufacturers has been instrumental in shaping U.S.
Giesse & Lewin, supra note 4, at 58 n.30. For an analysis of the arguments for
protection on national security grounds, with the conclusion that "while there
may indeed be valid security agreements, the jump to the current system of global
regulation of [textiles and apparel] trade is, at the least, heroic," see DONALD B.
KEESING & MAmRTN WOLF, TEx-r.E QUoTAs AcANSr DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 173
(1980).
28 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
29 See, e.g., The Textile and Apparel Trade Enforcemnent Act of 1985: Havrings on
H. 1256, 99th Cong. (1985) (statement of Rep. Edward Jenkins, GA) ("Since 1980,
the objectives of orderly market growth set forth in the multi-fiber arrangement
have not been achieved. From 1981 to 1984, imports of textile and apparel have
grown at an annual rate of 19 percent.").
30 Giesse & Lewin, supra note 4, at 62.
31 See id. (noting that analysts have observed that U.S. textile and apparel
manufacturers were the "'[blest industry performers' in the United States during
1985 .... ).
32 Id.
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trade policy in the apparel and textiles industry.33 As U.S. Senator
John C. Danforth described the favored relationship between the
industry and the state, "[t]he textile and apparel boys have the
street smarts in dealing with the government. Their method is to
ignore the GATT, ignore existing law, ignore the [International
Trade Commission]. They have used political muscle and have
gone to Congress for help."34 The textile and apparel industry,
unions, and associations form a politically powerful coalition that
has influenced legislators and legislation in its favor since the late
1950s.35 The coalition's influence arises from several factors, in-
cluding "economic strength, large work force, and the concentrated
presence of textile and apparel plants in the United States."36
First, the industry is vital to the U.S. economy and possesses
significant economic clout As of 1987, it provided for approxi-
mately $50 billion of the gross national product ("GNP"), which
was estimated at $4.5 trillion.37 It also provides more manufactur-
ing jobs than any other industrial sector of the economy and indi-
rectly contributes to many other sectors (e.g., construction, retail,
transportation, transactional services like finance, insurance, and
business services), which benefit from the value that is added at
different stages of textiles and apparel production.38
Second, the textiles, fiber, and apparel industry comprises the
largest manufacturing employer in the United States, employing
33 See, e.g., Giesse & Lewin, supra note 4, at 61.
While these arguments may have a superficial attraction, each of them is
either factually or theoretically false. Nonetheless, the U.S. textile and
apparel lobby has been able to persuade a very receptive U.S. Congress,
as well as the executive branch, to grant the textile and apparel industry
the highest degree of protection ....
Id. Perlow, supra note 2, at 94 (describing the U.S. textile industry as "powerful");
Landaw, supra note 1, at 218 ("The textile and apparel industries, unions, and as-
sociations form a politically powerful coalition that has enjoyed extraordinary
success in mobilizing the support of congressmen...").
34 John C. Danforth, A Rip in the Trade Latws, WASH. PosT, Oct. 23, 1985, at
A23.
35 See Landaw, supra note 1, at 218.
36 Id. at 219.
37 See KITTY DICKERSON, TExTILES AND APPAREL IN THE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMY 170 (1991). Even in comparison to some of the other major U.S. indus-
tries, the textiles industry contributes significantly to the U.S. economy. For ex-
ample, the auto-industry contributed $49.9 billion and primary metals $36.4 bil-
lion in 1987. See id.
38 See id. at 171-73.
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approximately two million white- and blue-collar workers directly
in forty-eight states, and approximately two million more workers
in supporting industries, such as farming, which supplies the sec-
tor with cotton and wool.39 The industry, accounting for approxi-
mately ten percent of the U.S. industrial labor force, "employs
more production employees than the U.S. automobile industry and
U.S. steel sector combined."40 Significantly, "the industry crosses
several hundred congressional districts," a fact that prevents leg-
islators in these districts from being "totally indifferent to the po-
litical demands of this industry."41
Third, while textile and apparel industries' plants are located
throughout the United States, they are heavily concentrated in the
Southeastern and mid-Atlantic regions.42 In the mid-Atlantic re-
gion, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York have the highest
concentration of apparel facilities in the country, employing one-
third of U.S. apparel workers; these apparel workers comprise one-
third of the total industrial labor force in New York City and
twenty-one percent in Philadelphia.43 The South is the largest ap-
parel employer in the United States, with Alabama, Georgia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas employing in ex-
cess of forty percent of the U.S. apparel industry.'4
The heaviest concentration of textile and apparel industries'
plants are located in the Southeast, where over seventy percent of
U.S. employment in weaving, yam, carpet, and thread mills, and
where fifty-six percent of U.S. employment in knitting mills are lo-
cated.45 The industry represents the "lifeblood" of such areas, and
"its success or decline has a severe impact on those communities
and regions."46 Furthermore, this regional concentration facilitates
the mobility of resources necessary to organize politically 47 and
positively influences strong bipartisan support for trade restric-
39 See Giesse & Lewin, supra note 4, at 83.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 See Landaw, supra note 1, at 219; see also Giesse & Lewin, supr7a note 4, at 85.
43 See id
44 See id at 85. In the Southeast, the highest degree of concentration is in
lower-wage rural areas, "with North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia repre-
senting the heart of the industry." See id. at 84.
45 See Landaw, supra note 1, at 219.
46 DICKErON, supra note 37, at 173.
47 See Giesse & Lewin, supra note 4, at 85.
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tions, where the "economic fortunes of a significant percentage of
the electorate... are intimately related to the health of the textiles
industry.. ."48 Therefore, the industry's regional concentration
has a tremendous impact on its ability to mobilize its resources and
to garner political support to promote protectionist trade policies.
Historically, the textile and apparel industry has lobbied effec-
tively and exercised strong political influence, extending as far
back as 1816 when the cotton and wool lobbies successfully se-
cured Congressional protection against imports.49 Currently, "[t]he
textile and apparel coalition is perhaps the most politically effec-
tive organization in the manufacturing sector."50 Members of the
coalition, including the Fiber, Fabric & Apparel Coalition for Trade
(which includes sixteen associations and unions),1 lobby for tex-
tile-quota legislation "efficiently" by concentrating their lobbying
efforts on the decision-makers who are most likely to be responsive
to their needs 5 2 Thus, "the industries' management court Republi-
cans, labor representatives concentrate on Democrats, and the cot-
ton members head relations with the farm groups."5 3
In contrast, groups that would be the primary source of coun-
tervailing pressures on protectionist policies and would support
freer trade, such as retailers, importers, and consumers, tradition-
ally have had little political influence.5 4 Several factors could ac-
48 Landaw, supra note 1, at 219-20 & n.105 (citing Susan F. Rasky, Executives
Expect a Legislative Shift on Trade, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 6, 1986, at D1 (statement of
Howard D. Cooley, President of Jockey International, Inc., an underwear and
sportswear manufacturing firm) ("Trade policy is a highly regional and philo-
sophical issue, not a particularly partisan one. Regionally speaking, Georgia is
still Georgia, no matter who the senator is. It would be political suicide to be from
Georgia, North Carolina, or South Carolina, and be a free-trader.")).
49 See Giesse & Lewin, supra note 4, at 85-86.
50 Landaw, supra note 1, at 220. Among the most politically powerful textiles
organizations are the American Textile Manufacturers Institute, the American
Apparel Manufacturers Institute, and the Man-Made Fiber Producers Association.
See Giesse & Lewin, supra note 4, at 86. Also, the National Cotton Council is a
powerful lobby representing U.S. cotton farmers. See id. Labor organizations ex-
ercising strong political influence include the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile
Workers' Union and the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union. See id,
51 See Landaw, supra note 1, at 220 n.10Z
52 See id. at 220.
53 Id. at 220.
54 See Giesse & Lewin, szqra note 4, at 88 (noting the "uneven balance" of po-
litical power between domestic textile interests, on the one hand, and importers,
retailers, and consumers, on the other); Landaw, supra note 1, at 220-21 (noting
[22:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol22/iss2/5
TOWARDS GATT INTEGRATION
count for their relative inability to exercise political influence in fa-
vor of less stringent trade policies. First, "the political influence of
exporting and importing concerns is limited to the large coastal
cities in which they are based,"5 5 in contrast to the apparel and tex-
tiles industry, which is pervasive throughout entire regions and in
forty-eight states. In addition, consumers are not informed as to
how legislation restricting trade might impact their economic in-
terests, and moreover, are generally too diffuse to organize as an
effective political lobby.5 6 Third, those groups that would favor
less protectionist trade policies utilize less capital and labor in their
operations than do the manufacturing concerns, and thus, "while
the interests supporting and opposing the legislation may be rela-
tively equal, the outcome nevertheless is not." s7
All of these elements combined explain the disparity of politi-
cal influence between the textiles and apparel industry and groups
representing countervailing interests, such as consumers and re-
tailers. The differences in wealth, size, concentration, and mobility
have permitted the textiles and apparel industry to successfully
lobby Congress for increased restrictions on imports. Thus, it is
important to regard these restrictive trade policies as a function of
ongoing and historically rooted internal domestic politics, rather
than as based on economic rationales, and thereby recognize that
the prolonged protection of the textile and apparel industry is eco-
nomically anachronistic.
4. HIsToRicAL IMPETUS FOR U.S. PROTECTIONISM IN THE TEXTILES
AND APPAREL INDUSTRY AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
4.1. Generally
Scholars have suggested that because foreign imports of textiles
and apparel have captured a significant portion of the U.S. mar-
that importers, retailers, and consumers have traditionally had little political
power).
55 Landaw, supra note 1, at 221.
56 See i. at 221 n.107 (noting the free-rider problem among consumers that
prevents organizing politically) (quoting MANcUR OLsoN, Jr., ThE Locic OF
COLLECtiVE ACTION 59-60 (1965) ("In a large, latent group there will be no ten-
dency for the group to organize to achieve its goals through the voluntary, ra-
tional action of the members of the group, even if there is perfect consensus.")).
57 Id. at 221 & n.105.
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ket,58 domestic manufacturers have sought to protect the domestic
market.5 9 Domestic industries continue to receive protection in the
form of import restrictions, although at the outset, these restric-
tions were justified as temporary measures to "readjust market
balance."60 Because of the nature of the textiles industry and the
ability of developing countries to enter textiles manufacturing with
little capital, textiles trade has become central to the economic de-
velopment of poorer countries. However, due to the expansion of
textiles exports on the part of developing countries and despite
their enhanced comparative advantage in textiles trade vis-A-vis
the United States and Europe, the United States and Europe sought
to protect their own markets from foreign goods by implementing
restrictive barriers to trade that continue in existence today. Thus,
in analyzing protectionism in textiles and apparel trade, it is critical
to examine the historical background as well as the economic im-
plications of protectionism in this controversial sector of the global
trading regime.
4.2. Historical Background of Protectionism in Textiles Trade
The particular nature of textiles trade regulation is an out-
growth of the nature of textile manufacturing itself. Textile manu-
facturing has traditionally been considered a "take-off" industry.61
As in Europe and the United States, where the growth of the textile
industry marked the beginning of industrialization, the expansion
of the textile sector in developing countries has similarly been a
58 In 1997, U.S. textile and apparel imports included $496 million from South
Korea, $1.441 billion from China, $766 million from Hong Kong, and $561 million
from Taiwan. See Paula L. Green, Industry Sees Measure as Stabilizing Force, J.
COMMERCE, June 13, 1997, at 1A. However, it should be noted that, historically,
these countries were not the largest exporters of textiles and clothing products in
the world; for example, in 1990, the world's largest supplier was Germany at $13.3
billion and the second-largest supplier was Italy at $9.3 billion. See John Zaro-
costas, Problems Continue to Plague GATF Textile Talks, J. COMMERCE, Oct. 23, 1992,
at 2A.
59 See, e.g., Perlow, supra note 2, at 94; Landaw, supra note 1, at 205.
60 Landaw, supra note 1, at 205. See also Giesse & Lewin, supra note 4, at 52
(noting that textile and trade have been regulated outside of the GATT system
since 1961, when a "temporary" exception to the GATT was made for cotton and
textiles under the Short-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade on
Textiles). For further discussion of the Short-Term Arrangement Regarding Inter-
national Trade on Textiles, see infra Section 5.1.1.
61 See Perlow, supra note 2, at 94.
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"primary stepping stone" to industrial development 62 For devel-
oping countries, which are often relatively labor abundant, the
textiles industry is "[u]niquely suited" to the early stages of indus-
trial development since the industry is generally labor-intensive
and requires limited capital and technology.63 For developing
countries, the special treatment of trade in textiles is a matter of
great concern to its economic well-being. Textiles trade is critical
to the economic development of developing countries, where tex-
tiles exports account for approximately tventy-five percent of all
industrial exports.64
By the same token, developed countries have found "the tran-
sition to more competitive, capital-intensive activities, in keeping
with the shifting of comparative economic advantage, a difficult
task"65 Hence, as Japan rapidly industrialized, with its textiles be-
coming increasingly competitive in the world market66 in the 1950s
and 1960s, Western countries, such as the United States and the
United Kingdom, began to oppose the general post-war trend of
trade liberalization 67 in the area of textiles.63
Japan, realizing that expansion of its exports to the United
States was inciting protectionist sentiments among U.S. textiles
concerns 69 and recognizing the need to cooperate with the United
States,70 instituted voluntary export restrictions on cotton textiles
62 Dickerson, supra note 1, at 396.
63 Id.
64 See Tit for GATT, supra note 14, at 61.
65 Perlow, supra note 2, at 94.
66 See id. at 94 n.5 ("Textiles were in the forefront of a broad expansion of
Japanese exports in the 1950's. Japan's industrial exports grew 600% between
1949 to 1959 from $533 million to $3,413 million.") (citation omitted); &ee also Lan-
daw, supra note 1, at 207 ("The Japanese manufacturers benefited at this time from
a relatively low-cost labor force and access to inexpensive American cotton.").
67 GATT was established in 1947 by twenty-three countries as a multilateral
approach to reducing tariffs and establishing rules for unrestricted trade. See
GATT, supra note 5, at 1700. At first, textiles trade was integrated under GATT.
See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 398-99.
63 See Perlow, supra note 2, at 94.
69 See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 400-01 (noting that Japan recognized that
expanding its exports could potentially "antagoniz[e] [its] most important cus-
tomer.").
70 Japan actually preferred voluntary export restraints ("VERs") over re-
straints under GATT Article XD(, which permits global nondiscriminatory trade
restraints when domestic import-competing industries are seriously injured by
fair import competition. See GATT, supra note 5, art. XIX. One advantage that
VERs had over restraints under GATT XIX is "the additional measure of flexibility
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and ten groups of manufactured goods between 1957 and 1961.71
However, the restriction on Japanese imports did not prevent the
entry of imports from other countries into the U.S. market. Hong
Kong was soon able to take advantage of the voluntary export re-
straints on Japanese imports into the United States and gained sig-
nificant entry into the U.S. market, which now had less imports
from Japan. As a result, "[i]mports from Hong Kong grew from
nearly 70 million square yards in 1958 to almost 290 million square
yards in 1960, making them the largest supplier to the U.S. mar-
ket."72 In addition, U.S. efforts to negotiate a voluntary export re-
straint agreement with Hong Kong, like the one reached with Ja-
pan, failed.73 At the same time, increases in imports from other
countries, including Portugal, Egypt, Pakistan, and India, pene-
trated the U.S. market.74 In response, the Kennedy Administration
sought a formal trade agreement to counter increases in import
growth.75
5. AGREEMENTS INSTITUTIONALIZING TRADE PROTECTIONISM
5.1. Agreements Covering Cotton Textile Trade
Beginning with the Short-Term Arrangement on Cotton Textile
Trade ("STA" or "Short Term Arrangement") in 1961, the United
States and Europe expanded and continued their protectionist
stance on textiles trade through agreements with developing ex-
porting countries. Thus, while the Short Term Agreement, as its
and control they offered the exporter in determining export ceilings." Perlow, su-
pra note 2, at 96.
71 See Perlow, supra note 2, at 95 (noting that this resort to a VER was effec-
tively a reintroduction of a protectionist instrument from the 1930s Depression era
that was to be widely applied in ensuing decades to restrict a variety of imports
from Japan and developing countries); Landaw, supra note 1, at 207. Significantly,
the VERs on Japanese exports to the United States "set the pattern of pressure by
strong import-competing industries for action by their governments, which, in
turn, pressure the exporting countries' governments (or even industries) into
'voluntarily' restraining imports." Perlow, supra note 2, at 95 rL9. The term vol-
untary export restraint may be regarded as "something of a misnomer as the
thinly veiled threat of harsher, unilateral action underlies most negotiations for
such restraints." Id.
72 Landaw, supra note 1, at 207.
73 See Perlow, supra note 2, at 95.
74 See Landaw, supra note 1, at 207-08 & n.19 (citations omitted).
75 See id. at 208.
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name suggests, was meant to be a temporary exception to the
GATT's primary principles of liberalized trade through nondis-
crimination and the general prohibition against quantitative re-
strictions, it evolved in subsequent renewals to become even more
protectionist and discriminatory than was originally intendedV6
5.1.1. Short-Term Arrangement on Cotton Textile Trade
In 1961, the STA was negotiated between sixteen countries, in-
cluding the United States, Hong Kong, Japan, the countries of the
EEC, Pakistan, and India77 It was designed to be a one-year pro-
gram during which the parties could negotiate a more formal tex-
tiles and apparel agreement.7 8 The STA provided that in cases
where a participating country believed that the exports were
threatening to cause "market disruption," the participating country
could request the exporting nation to restrain exports at a level not
lower than the level prevailing for a twelve-month period ending
June 30, 1961.79
76 See Giesse & Lewin, supra note 4, at 53.
77 Interim Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles,
July 21,1961,12 U.S.T. 1674, T.LA.S. No. 4884 [hereinafter STA].
78 See id, at § A; Landaw, supra note 1, at 208; see also Rebecca Reese, Interna-
tional Trade in Textiles and Apparel: The Legal Regime, in THE Co,.iERcE DEPT.
SPEAKs 1992 DEVELOPMENTS IN IMPORT ADhmNiTRATION: EXPORT & INVESTMENT
ABROAD, 381, 387 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 789,
1992); Renee T. Legierski, Out in the Cold: 7he Combined Effects of NAFTA ad the
MFA on the Caribbean Basin Textile Industry, 2 MINM. J. GLOBAL TRADE 305, 309
(1993) (noting that developed countries sought out a formal agreement to equalize
competition in the textile and apparel sector).
79 See Landaw, supra note 1, at 208. "Market disruption" includes
(i) a sharp and substantial increase of particular products from particular
sources, where (ii) the products in question are offered at prices substan-
tially below those prevailing for similar goods of comparable quality in
the market of the importing country and (iii) there is 'serious injury' to
domestic producers or threat thereof.
KEFSING & WOLF, supra note 27, at 19; Dickerson, supra note 1, at 403-06 (noting
that the concept of "market disruption" became a central issue in textile trade
policies).
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5.1.2. Long-Term Arrangement for Cotton Textile Trade
The STA was replaced in 1962 by the Long-Term Arrangement
for Cotton Textile Trade ("LTA"),8° whose twenty-two signatory
countries included the United States, Mexico, Hong Kong, Japan,
the countries of the EEC, India, the Republic of Korea, and the Re-
public of China.81 Like the STA, the LTA was to impose quantita-
tive restrictions on trade,82 specifying product-by-product and
country-by-country import restrictions for a period of five years.83
As with the STA, the LTA was intended to be a temporary measure
to protect manufacturing interests in importing countries, but in
practice, the LTA was renewed several times during the course of
twelve years, "until the unceasing pressure to widen its scope, in
order to meet all the new forms of developing-country competi-
tion" eventually resulted in the creation of the MFA.84
The LTA authorized the importing countries to restrict imports
of cotton textiles from exporting countries, and the imports were
subject to a five percent limit on the volume growth in quota rates
on an annual basis.8 5 The United States was able to restrict textiles
and apparel imports under Article III of the LTA,86 and had re-
stricted imports of specific cotton textile and apparel products
from seventeen major exporting countries by 1967.87 Significantly,
within that year, these exporting countries accepted bilateral
agreements with the United States, pursuant to Article IV of the
LTA, which stated that "[n]othing... shall prevent the application
80 Long-Term Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Tex-
tiles, Feb. 9, 1962, 13 U.S.T. 2672, T.I.A.S. No. 5240, 471 U.N.T.S. 296 [hereinafter
LTA].
81 See id.
82 See Reese, supra note 78, at 388.
83 See Landaw, supra note 1, at 208.
84 KEESING & WOLF, supra note 27, at 22.
85 See DIcKERsoN, supra note 37, at 304.
86 Article III of the LTA provides that:
If imports from a participating country or countries into another partici-
pating country of certain cotton textile products not subject to import re-
strictions should cause or threaten to cause disruption in the market of
the importing country, that country may request the participating coun-
try or countries... to consult with a view to removing or avoiding such
disruption.
LTA, supra note 80, art. 3, para. 1.
87 See Landaw, supra note 1, at 208-09 (citation omitted).
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of mutually acceptable arrangements on other terms not inconsis-
tent with the basic objectives of this Arrangement."6 The United
States justified the terms of the LTA on the grounds that it was the
"lesser of two evils, ... [that] without the multilateral arrangement,
the importing countries would have continued to increase their
unilateral restraints on textile imports from Japan and [the devel-
oping countries]."89 Furthermore, its proponents argued that a
multilateral arrangement would provide "orderly growth." 0
However, in light of the U.S. textiles and apparel trade deficit of
only five percent and the European Commission's surplus at the
time the LTA was promulgated, it is dubious that the choice to im-
pose multilateral arrangements restricting trade was indeed the
"lesser of two evils" and that it would generate "orderly growth."91
5.2. New Developments in the 1970s Textiles Market: Polyester and
Nylon
In 1970, with the advent of new technology in synthetic fibers
and in spite of the LTA, the United States was again faced with in-
creasing textile and apparel imports that threatened domestic pro-
ducers.92 U.S. imports of synthetic fibers increased more than ten-
fold during the eleven-year regime of the LTA.93 This import
growth was predominantly in textiles and apparel made of syn-
thetic fibers that were not covered under the existing agreements,
which restricted the cotton textile trade.94 Thus, the expansion of
exports of newly developed synthetic fibers, a product group un-
s LTA, supra note 80, art. 4.
89 DIcKERsoN, supra note 37, at 304.
90 Id. at 305.
91 Id. at 304-05.
92 See CLINE, supra note 10, at 148.
93 See Landaw, supra note 1, at 209; cf. Perlow, supra note 2, at 100 & n.28
(noting that even though sales of synthetic yarns and fabrics by developing coun-
tries increased tventyfold between 1967 and 1973, they still only accounted for 6%
of world trade in synthetic yarns and fabrics); see also CN-E, supra note 10, at 148
(discussing how U.S. imports of man-made textiles increased from 31 million
pounds in 1960 to 329 million pounds in 1970).
94 See CLINE, suipra note 10, at 148 (stating that between 1961 to 1972, U.S. tex-
tile imports increased from $1.02 billion to $2.4 billion, and apparel imports in-
creased from $648 million to $3.5 billion (in 1982 prices), for an average annual
growth rate of 11.5% for textile and apparel sectors combined.) The rise in im-
ports was driven by synthetic fibers not covered under the cotton textile agree-
ments, and from 1960 to 1970, U.S. imports of synthetic fiber textiles rose from 31
million pounds to 329 million pounds, nearly an 1100% increase. Id.
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protected under the LTA, again engendered significant concern
(and protectionist sentiment) to domestic manufacturers as Asian
countries moved aggressively into this manufacturing sector.
Ironically, Asian exporters quickly shifted production into syn-
thetic fibers in part because of restrictions on their access to cotton
textile markets under the LTA. 95
To curtail the influx of imports, the Nixon Administration ne-
gotiated bilateral agreements with the "Big Four" exporting coun-
tries: Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan; but these bilat-
eral agreements, covering wool and synthetic fibers, conflicted
with the provisions of the narrower scope of the LTA.96 As dissat-
isfaction with the inadequate scope of the LTA grew, a more gen-
eral agreement that would broaden the scope of regulation to cover
imports of new fibers, including synthetics and wool, became more
desirable.97 The result was the MFA.98
5.3. The Multi-Fiber Arrangement as an Exception to Free Trade
Under GATT
5.3.1. Generally
The MFA, or the Arrangement Regarding International Trade
in Textiles, which was negotiated under GATT and went into effect
on January 1, 1974, was a significant departure from GATT princi-
ples99 because it permitted the imposition of quantitative restric-
tions on textiles without Most Favored Nation ("MFN") treat-
ment.'00 In contrast to the MFA, Article VIII of GATT requires that
95 See Perlow, supra note 2, at 100 ("Far Eastern producers moved aggres-
sively into the new sector, in large measure because their access to cotton textile
markets was restricted."); Landaw, supra note 1, at 209 n.30.
96 See Landaw, supra note 1, at 209.
97 See id.
98 See Reese, supra note 78, at 389.
99 The restrictions on textiles and apparel imports are in direct contradiction
to two basic principles of GATT, including nondiscrimination through Most-
Favored Nation treatment (see GATT, supra note 5, art. I, para. 1), and the general
proscription against quantitative restrictions (see GATT, supra note 5, art. XI, para.
1).
100 The MFA authorizes quantitative restrictions and allows countries to ap-
ply these restrictions on a country-by-country and product-by-product basis. See
generally GATT, Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20,
1973, 25 U.S.T. 1001, T.I.A.S. No. 7840, art. 1, para 2 [hereinafter MFA I] (provid-
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any quantitative restriction be subject to MFN treatment.101 Under
the MFA, textiles trade is subject to a complex system of unilateral
and bilateral quotas, on a product-by-product and country-by-
country basis.' 02 The stated objectives of the MFA are to achieve
expansion and liberalization of world trade in textiles, while en-
suring the orderly and equitable development of textiles trade and
the avoidance of market disruption in importing countries and ex-
porting countries.103 However, as one author noted, "The Multi-
Fibre Arrangement was instituted ... as a temporary measure to
protect developed countries' industries from the floods of cheap
imports .... "104
5.3.2. The MFA's Tumultuous Passage
In the 1970s, manufacturers in developing countries began to
shift production from cotton to synthetic fiber products that were
not subject to the LTA restrictions. 0 Thus, the LTA became in-
creasingly obsolete as imports of synthetic fiber products into the
United States grew. Essentially, "the developing countries suc-
ceeded in finding, during this period, more holes in the dike than
ing for the reduction of barriers to trade as well as for "the progressive liberaliza-
tion of world trade in textile products...").
101 See GAIT, szpra note 5, art. VIII, para- 1.
No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any Contracting Party
on the importation of any product of the territory of any other Contract-
ing Party or on the exportation of any product destined for the territory
of any other Contracting Party, unless the importation of the like product
of all third countries or the exportation of the like product to all third
countries is similarly prohibited or restricted.
Id.
102 See MFA I, supra note 100, art. 3, para. 4.
103 See i art. 1, para. Z
The basic objectives shall be to achieve the expansion of trade, the reduc-
tion of barriers to such trade and the progressive liberalization of world
trade in textile products, while at the same time ensuring the orderly and
equitable development of this trade and avoidance of disruptive effects
in individual markets and on individual lines of production in both im-
porting and exporting countries.
Id.; see also Legierski, supra note 78, at 311 (explaining the goals of the MFA 1).
104 Cecilia Quiambao, MFA's Demise May Mean Early Pain, Later Gains for
Asians, Economist Says, J. COmimRCE, June 6,1995, at 5A.
105 See Dickerson, snpra note 1, at 409-10; see also discussion, supra Section 5.2.
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the developed [countries] found fingers with which to close
them."106
During the Nixon Administration, the Multi-Fiber Arrange-
ment was passed with the intention of sealing those holes. In the
United States, President Nixon tightened the pressure on a reluc-
tant and increasingly prosperous and politically stronger Japan to
forge a multilateral textile agreement whereby Japanese imports of
synthetic fibers and wool would be restricted.10 7 Nixon threatened
to invoke the Trading with the Enemy Act,108 which would impose
unilateral restraints on Japan. On the day that the Trading with the
Enemy Act was to enter into force, Japan succumbed to U.S. threats
to unilaterally restrict Japanese imports and agreed to limit imports
of wool and synthetic fibers.109 The United States thereafter
reached similar bilateral agreements with Hong Kong, South Ko-
rea, and Taiwan."10
U.S. restrictions on such imports had a significant impact on
Europe as well, due to heightened trade diversion to Europe. By
1972, with bilateral agreements restricting exports to the United
States from Japan and other Asian countries, shipments of Asian
products were increasingly diverted to Europe, which thereby pre-
cipitated Europe to agree to a multilateral agreement covering
synthetic fibers and wool."' Once the Europeans were willing, a
multi-fiber arrangement thus seemed inevitable.12
5.3.3. Stages of the MFA I Through IV as a Progression Towards
Further Trade Restrictions.
The MFA was negotiated under GATT and went into effect on
January 1, 1974. Since its inception, it has governed most of the
$248 billion a year trade in textiles and apparel.3 It was originally
106 KEESING & WOLF, supra note 27, at 22.
107 See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 410.
108 See Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. § 5(b)(1)(B) (1988) ("During the
time of war, the President may... regulate... any... importation or exportation
of... any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any in-
terest.").
109 See CLINE, supra note 10, at 149.
110 See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 411.
111 See CLINE, supra note 10, at 149.
112 See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 411.
113 See John Zarocostas, EU Blocks Compromise on Textile-Quota Phaseout, J.
COMMERCE, Jan. 12,1995, at 1A.
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meant to be a temporary arrangement governing the trade of tex-
tiles, but it has been renegotiated at the insistence of the developed
importing countries and will therefore stay in place until 2005. The
MFA does not establish import restrictions by itself. Instead, it
provides a framework of rules and procedures under which mem-
ber countries can impose quota restrictions." 4 Quotas are usually
negotiated bilaterally, but unilateral quotas are permitted if the
import of a particular product from a specific country is disrupt-
ing, or might potentially disrupt, the domestic market" 5 Since its
original inception in 1974, the MFA has undergone numerous ex-
tensions, divided into four stages (I through IV), that have progres-
sively increased the level of protection of the textiles and apparel
industry. 6 The four stages are briefly discussed below.
5.3.3.1. MFA I: 1974-1977
MFA I covered manufactured fibers and wool, in addition to
cotton and the cotton blends that were covered in previous agree-
ments. In its original conception, the MFA was to take into account
the interests of both the exporting and the importing countries and
to contribute to the economic growth of developing countries." 7
Its stated objective was:
to achieve the expansion of trade, the reduction of barriers
to such trade and the progressive liberalization of world
trade in textile products, while at the same time ensuring
the orderly and equitable development of this trade and the
avoidance of disruptive effects in individual markets and
on individual lines of production in both importing and ex-
porting countries."8
In addition, the MFA was a general, multilateral agreement
governing the bilateral agreements that could be reached between
"4 See WFA I, supra note 100; H.R. Rep. No. 276, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1987).
"15 See MFA I, supra note 100, art. 3, para. 5.
116 See discussion infra Parts 5.3.3.1.-5.3.3.4.
117 See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 412.
Is FA I, supra note 100, art. 3, para. 2.
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participating countries." 9 Under the MFA, a developed importing
country was able to negotiate agreements with a developing ex-
porting country and, through the safeguard mechanism, establish
quota levels on textiles product categories that were deemed to
cause, or could potentially cause, market disruption in the domes-
tic importing market.120 This represented a "significant departure
from GATT's nondiscrimination rule" by permitting importing
countries to "single out exporting countries considered to be a
problem and negotiate varying agreements among textile trading
countries."121
The differences between the MFA and the LTA are significant.
First, the MFA established a multilateral surveillance institution,
the Textiles Surveillance Body ("TSB"), to supervise the imple-
mentation of the MFA.122 Second, a committee was established to
manage the MFA, and was comprised of all signatory members.123
Third, stricter rules for determining "market disruption" were es-
tablished. 124 Fourth, quota allowances were permitted to increase
by no less than six percent per year, rather than the five percent
minimum allowed under the LTA.12 5 Fifth, the implementation of
new provisions, such as "swing," "carry forward," and "carryo-
ver" further enhanced quota flexibility under the MFA.126 Thus,
while the MFA was an extension of the LTA, it represented the
multilateral institutionalism of the textiles and apparel trading re-
gime that ultimately led to a further divergence from the GATT
119 See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 414 (stating that the forty-two participating
countries included all the developed countries (with the EC as one participant)
and all the major textile exporting countries, even if they were not GATT con-
tracting parties).
120 See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 413.
121 Dickerson, supra note 1, at 413 ("For example, the United States' quota
levels might vary significantly from Hong Kong to South Korea to Taiwan, de-
pending almost entirely on the extent to which a country's products were consid-
ered threats.").
122 See WFA I, supra note 100, art. 11; Dickerson, supra note 1, at 413.
123 See MFA I, supra note 100, art. 10; Dickerson, supra note 1, at 413-14.
124 See MFA I, supra note 100, at Annex A; Dickerson, supra note 1, at 414.
125 See MFA I, supra note 100, at Annex B; Dickerson, suipra note 1, at 414.
126 See MIFA I, supra note 100; Dickerson, suipra note 1, at 414. "Swing" per-
mitted transfer from one category to another if there was an unused quota; "carry
forward" permitted borrowing from the next year's quota; and "carryover" per-
mitted the exporting country to add unused quota from one year to the following
year's quota. Id.
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principles of nondiscrimination and the general prohibition on
quantitative restraints.
5.3.3.2. MFA I: 1977-1981
While the original MFA was to last only four years, from 1974
through 1977, the developed exporting countries pushed for exten-
sions, arguing that they needed more time to "adjust" 27 Thus,
subsequent renewals of the MFA, or "Protocols of Extension," ex-
tended and added changes to the original MFA.123 Much of MFA
II, which was in place from 1977 through 1981, was shaped by the
European Community,'29 which was concerned with the growth of
imports into its markets, precipitated by the diversion of Asian
products into Europe due to increased protectionism in the United
States.13 0 In addition, with a serious recession in Europe, European
127 See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 414.
125 See Protocol Extending the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in
Textiles, Dec- 14,1977,29 U.S.T. 2287, T.I.A.S. No. 8939 [hereinafter MFA Il; Dick-
erson, supra note 1, at 414.
129 Numerous reasons could account for the relatively less aggressive stance
taken by the United States in comparison to the European Community in the MFA
H1 negotiations. First, the U.S. dollar depreciated between 1971 and 1973, thereby
increasing the competitiveness of U.S. industry on the world market. Second, the
United States already had protectionist agreements in place, as a result of the bi-
lateral agreements prior to MFA I and the agreements that it quickly enforced
when MFA I was effectuated. Third, the United States did not face a rapidly de-
creasing employment rate, unlike Europe, whose employment rate dropped one-
sixth between 1973 and 1977. See CLuNE, sipra note 10, at 151. Other scholars have
suggested that the European Community took a more relaxed position on quota
restrictions vis-&-vis importing countries because of its failure to anticipate to
what extent diversion from more protected markets, such as that of the United
States, would occur. The most important factors were most likely the inability of
the European Community to: anticipate a downturn in their economy; measure
the potential for import surges; and coordinate trade policy between the countries
of the European Community. In addition, the European Community's balance of
trade in textiles and apparel was positive in 1974 and 1975, and it was not until
1976 that its trade deficit became substantial, which in turn aggravated the trend
towards lower employment that was primarily caused by weak demand and
higher labor productivity. See KEESING & WoLF, supra note 27, at 58. Another sig-
nificant factor that contributed to the European Community taking on a more ag-
gressive protectionist position was the increase in EC imports in intraregional
trade; in Italy, the trade balance in all textiles grew from $1.7 million in 1973 to
$27 million in 1976, with continuing expansion. In trade within the European
Community, Italy's positive trade balance nearly doubled from $1.1 billion to $2.0
billion from 1973 to 1976, in contrast to the rest of the Community, whose net
trade deficit in textiles and clothing grew from $650 million to $3.2 billion during
that same period. See it
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negotiators to the MFA were ready to take a tougher position
against imports than they had taken in the negotiating original
MFA.131 Significantly, the smaller developed countries (such as
Australia and Canada) generally had difficulty in getting import-
ing developing countries to negotiate and impose quotas, and
therefore relied on the MFA safeguard mechanism or invoked Ar-
ticle XIX of GATT.132
The European Community's specific concerns were the six per-
cent growth rates authorized under MFA I and the need to prove
"market disruption" in order to negotiate bilateral agreements
with a growth rate of less than six percent; eventually, the Euro-
pean Community achieved its goal for "jointly agreed reasonable
departures" from MFA I, including reduced quota levels, denials
or reduction of the flexibility provisions, and growth rates reduced
to under six percent 3 3
Essentially, MFA II permitted even more restrictive bilateral
agreements. Significantly, the European Community and the
United States implemented "safety-net" provisions that would ap-
ply restraints on unrestricted exports if they reached a certain
threshold134 Thus, the MFA II was a substantial departure from
the original MFA, and a further estrangement from the GATT prin-
130 See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 414-15. With the advent of MFA I, the
United States immediately negotiated bilateral agreements restricting trade,
whereas the EC did not enter into such restrictive agreements early on. It waited
nearly two years to impose Community-wide MFA restrictions on major export-
ers, due to the length of time involved in coming to a mutual agreement among its
member countries. Thus, during this period of less stringent restrictions into the
European market, the extensive U.S. restrictions led to trade diversion of Asian
products into the European market. See id.
131 See id. at 415.
132 KEESING & WOLF, supra note 27, at 58-59 (noting that the MFA and the
TSB's authority was diminished as a result of Australia and Canada's invocation
of GATT Article XIX and argument that these actions were not the proper author-
ity of the TSB).
133 See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 415-16. Therefore, countries could individu-
ally depart from the original MFA that had been agreed upon by all the partici-
pating countries by making restrictive bilateral agreements that derogated from
the provisions of the original MFA. See id. at 415.
134 See id. at 416. The provision was called the "basket extractor" in Europe,
and in the United States, it was called the "call mechanism." Both had the same
purpose of restraining unrestricted exports when the importing country believed
there was a risk of market disruption. See id.
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ciples of nondiscrimination and the general prohibition on quanti-
tative restrictions.13
5.3.3.3. MFA III: 1981-1986
During the period of MFA III, the United States restricted even
more sources and more products than before by applying new re-
strictions or by imposing unilateral measures.36 However, these
heightened restrictions did not prevent U.S. imports from increas-
ing rapidly.37
The policy driving the third MFA13s was influenced heavily by
the domestic politics of the European Community and United
States and their response to a changing global trading order. Dur-
ing the period between 1977 and 1981, the number of exporting
countries in the textiles and apparel industry increased dramati-
cally. Between 1971 and 1979, the percentage market share of tex-
tile and apparel imports from Hong Kon& Taiwan, and South Ko-
rea increased from approximately thirty percent to forty-two
percent139 In addition, the U.S. apparel trade deficit increased due
to the emphasis on apparel production by developing countries.140
Hence, in the United States, industry leaders again demanded
greater protection from exporting countries. In February 1979,
President Carter introduced the "Administration Textile Program,"
commonly known as the Carter "White Paper."141 The White Pa-
per's purpose was to reduce the aggregate import growth and vol-
ume, and to expand measures to control the "import surges that
cause market disruption."'42 In addition, the White Paper sought
135 See id. at 416.
136 See id. at 418.
137 See Landaw, supra note 1, at 212.
13 See Protocol Extending the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in
Textiles, Dec. 22,1981, T.I.A.S. No. 10,323 [hereinafter MFA 1l]. Forty-tvo coun-
tries were MFA II signatories, including China, which was not permitted to join
GATT. For importing countries, Chinese participation in MFA vas desirable so
that the importing countries could legalize and formalize restraints on Chinese
products, and for China, membership in the MA (permitting bilateral agree-
ments) was preferable to unilateral restraints on its products. See Dickerson, supra
note 1, at 419-20.
139 Landaw, supra note 1, at 211.
140 See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 416-17.
141 See Background Material on the Midtfiber Arrangement: Staff of House Sub-
comm. on Trade, 96th Cong. 3 (1979) [hereinafter Trade Subcommittee Report].
142 See id. at 5; see also Giesse & Lewin, supra note 4, at 117.
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to link import growth in import-sensitive categories to increases in
U.S. domestic consumption. 143 The first countries to which the new
policy applied were Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea.
Complaints of sharing a disproportionate burden of per capita
imports of low-cost textiles with the United States and Japan were
once again raised by the European Community.144 Despite these
complaints, however, if net trade were taken into account, the
European Community's net imports from developing countries,
excluding those in southern Europe, would have been approxi-
mately equal to those of the United States, at $4 billion, in 1979.145
However, the European Community's primary objectives in rene-
gotiation were cutbacks in quotas by dominant exporters, such as
Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan, and the limitation of quota
growth for other countries to below six percent per annum; in sup-
port of these objectives, the European Community argued that its
domestic consumption was stagnant or was rising more slowly
than it had been previously.146
For developing countries, the primary objective of MFA III was
to seek greater discipline and to eliminate the clause permitting
"reasonable departures" from the norms on export restraints.
While the developing exporting countries were ultimately able to
have the "reasonable departures" clause removed from MFA Ill,
other provisions, such as the "anti-surge mechanism"147 and a
limitation on imports from major suppliers, 48 were added.
The anti-surge mechanism provided for special restraints to be
available to importing countries where there was a sharp increase
of imports of products with previously underutilized quotas. 149
Thus, "[w]here such significant difficulties stem from consistently
under-utilized larger restraint levels and cause or threaten serious
and palpable damage to domestic industry, an exporting partici-
pant may agree to mutually satisfactory solutions or arrange-
ments." 5 0 In other words, an importing country could take action
143 See Trade Subcommittee Report, supra note 141, at 5; Giesse & Lewin, su-
pra note 4, at 117-18.
144 See CLINE, supra note 10, at 154.
145 See id.
146 See id.
147 See MFA III, supra note 138, para. 10.
148 See id. para. 9.
149 See CLINE, supra note 10, at 154.
50 MFA III, supra note 138, para. 10.
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in the form of import restraints if an underutilized quota were
filled in a short period of time, and this surge of imports would re-
sult in "market disruption" in the importing country 52'
Therefore, just as the MFA II before it, the MFA III drifted fur-
ther away from GATT principles and trade liberalization, and
moved towards increased trade restrictions. As the GATT Secre-
tariat stated, "[r]estraints under MFA III were not only more exten-
sive but were in many cases more restrictive."15 2 Perhaps more
significant and far-reaching than the newly enacted restrictive pro-
visions themselves was the very fact that these provisions were
permitted to extend the MFA even further than had previously
been allowed, thereby expanding the possibilities for deviating
further from GATT principles.5 3
5.3.3.4. MFA IV: 1986-1991 and Extensions ofMFA IV:
1991-1993
Despite the expansion of restrictions under MFA III, "[t]he
[U.S.] governmenfs program to slow import growth [was] just
not... effective," as Carlos Moore, executive vice president of the
American Textile Manufacturer's Institute, noted.154 For example,
by the late Eighties, more than seventy Korean textile companies
had production facilities abroad, with an estimated investment of
$56 million, and sought to expand further.55 Thus, MFA IV was
negotiated, renewing the MFA for an additional five years through
July 31, 1991.156 As with previous MFA renewals, the text of the
MFA remained unchanged, but significant modifications were in-
corporated through the Protocol of Extension.157
MFA IV had fifty-four signatories. While it had many provi-
sions similar to the provisions of previous MFAs, a significant
change was included: additional fibers were covered. This expan-
15, See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 418 rL120.
152 Id. at 418 (citing GATT, Updating the 19S4 Secretariat Study "Txtiles and
Clothing in the World Economy," Nov. 30,1987, at 48).
1-3 See YING-PIK CHOI Er AL, THE MULTI-FBRE ARRANGMET IN THEORY ANiD
PRACnCE 55 (1985).
154 P.T. Bangsberg, Korean Pursit of Textile Sites Indudes U.S., J. CoMErcE,
Mar. 21,1989, at 1A, 1A.
155 See id&
156 Protocol Extending the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in
Textiles, July 31,1986, GATT B.I.S.D. (33d Supp.) at 7 (1937) [hereinafter MFA IV].
157 CUNE, supra note 10, at 219.
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sion of covered fibers was made to the MFA in response to im-
porting countries' concerns about developing exporting countries
which had previously been able to avoid restrictions on imports by
making their products with unrestricted fibers, such as linen,
ramie, and silk, and blends thereof. 5 8 MFA IV covered products in
which these fibers exceeded fifty percent of the weight or value of
the imported goods, while silk remained excluded.159 The expan-
sion of fiber coverage was of particular concern to India and China,
which traded significant amounts of ramie.160
In addition, quotas were generally increased as a percentage
based on the previous year, thereby providing little opportunity
for quota expansion for the smaller or poorer exporting countries
since the base on which the percentage increase was calculated
would be small.'61 Furthermore, no cutbacks or tightening of quo-
tas were permitted; instead, exporting countries were mandated to
accept lower rates of growth and flexibility.162 In addition, the im-
porting countries "committed themselves to making improvements
in the bilateral agreements for increased access."'16
Although the MFA was scheduled to expire in July 1991, the
Uruguay Round negotiations stalled, and the one-year MFA exten-
sions continued for three years, from 1991 to 1993.164 From the out-
set of the Uruguay Round, demanded the demise of the MFA, and
pressed for the liberalization of textiles and apparel trade under
GATT rules.165 In a noncommittal response, however, the minis-
ters at the Uruguay talks referred only to the "eventual integration
of this sector into GATT."166 Importing countries such as India and
158 See MFA IV, supra note 156, at para. 24(i); Landaw, supra note 1, at 213-14.
For example, 1985 imports into the United States from China made from non-
MFA fibers increased 346% over the previous year. See DIcKERSON, slpra note 37,
at 315.
159 See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 420. Although the United States did not
produce any ramie, domestic producers argued that ramie products caused mar-
ket disruption by replacing similar items of other fibers. See DicKErSoN, supra
note 37, at 316.
160 See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 420.
161 See id.
162 See id.
163 Id.
164 See id. at 421.
165 See id. at 424.
166 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round of Sept. 20, 1986, GATr
B.I.S.D. (33d Supp.) at 19,23 (1985-86).
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Pakistan took the position that exporting nations were putting tex-
tiles and clothing "on the back burner," while some Western offi-
cials pushed to extend the MFA until January 1994, "on the pretext
that they need[ed] more time to amend all the necessary national
legislation." 67
5.3.4. Phasing Out of the MFA and the Uruguay Round Agreement
on Textiles and Clothing
During the Uruguay Round, which went into effect on January
1, 1995, members negotiated the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing ("ATC"),16s which established rules govern-
ing the integration of textiles and apparel into GATT during the
ten-year transition period.169 In addition, the ATC established a
quasi-judicial body to supervise the implementation of the ATC
and to adjudicate disputes among members during the MFA
phase-out period, called the Textiles Monitoring Body ('TMB"),
which has been criticized by both developed and developing
countries.170
Under the ATC, two key mechanisms for the progressive inte-
gration of the textiles industry into GATT are: (1) the elimination
of quotas on selected products in four stages over a ten-year period
ending in 2005, and (2) the increase of quota growth rates on re-
maining products at each of the first three stages.17' Thus, if suc-
cessfully implemented, the ATC will be a mechanism by which
167 John Zarocostas, Problems Continue to Plague GATT Textile Talls, J.
COMIMERCE, Oct. 22,1992, at 2A, 2A.
163 See ATC, supra note 3.
169 See John F. Cobau & Arthur Watson, Legal Issutes in International Trade in
Textiles and Clothing- A Post-Uruguay Round Perspective, in THE CoM.EmCE DEFt.
SPEAKS ON INT'L TRADE AND INvFsrhmr, 239, 243 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice
Course, Handbook Series No. 1075,1998).
170 See K Kristine Duru, Note, Te Textiles Monitoring Body: Cm it Bring Tex-
tile Trade into GAT?, 7 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 123,124 (1988). The TMB has suf-
fered harsh criticisms from both the exporting and importing countries in its ad-
judicatory role. Representatives of U.S. textile and apparel industries have
asserted that the TMB is rigged against them, while exporting countries claim that
the officials who are appointed by the importing countries are biased and lack
credibility in resolving disputes. See id.
171 See ATC, supra note 3, arL 2. Under Article 2, the members have the dis-
cretion of selecting specific products for each stage of integration, but limits these
selections to those incorporating products from each of four groups: tops; yams;
made-up textile products; and clothing. See Dunn, supra note 170, at 128-29; ATC,
supra note 3, art. 2(6), 2(8).
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members may eliminate quantitative restraints and thereby restore
market principles for textiles and apparel trade.1 72
In addition, the ATC incorporates a transitional safeguard
mechanism to be triggered if an importing country determines that
imports of products that are not yet integrated into GATT and are
not already subject to a quota are causing "serious damage" or
pose an "actual threat" thereto.173 Pursuant to Article 6 of the ATC,
which governs the transitional safeguard mechanism, before a
quota is imposed, the importing member country is required to
demonstrate that "a particular product is being imported into its
territory in such increased quantities as to cause serious damage,
or actual threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing like
and/or directly competitive products."'174 In determining whether
there has been serious damage or actual threat thereto, a country
that avails itself of the safeguard mechanism must examine the ef-
fect of those imports on the state of a particular industry by look-
ing at changes in "relevant economic variables." 175
Under Article 6 of the ATC, the TMB is responsible for deter-
mining whether an agreement between two countries regarding
the transitional safeguard is justified with the provisions of the Ar-
ticle under the ATC.76 Disputes under the ATC are thus governed
by a set of rules that are distinct from those under the GATT re-
gime. However, the power of the TMB to enforce its determina-
tions seems limited; while member countries must "endeavour to
accept in full the recommendations of the TMB,"'177 a country can
reject the TMB's recommendations and either country can have its
172 See Dunn, supra note 170, at 129. The author posits that if the ATC were
effectively implemented to liberalize trade in textiles and apparel, one third of the
total anticipated economic gain from trade liberalization under the Uruguay
Round will result from dismantling the old restrictions on trade in this sector. See
id. at 124.
173 See ATC, supra note 3, art. 6(1), 6(2) & 6(4). See also Dunn, supra note 170,
at 130.
174 Id., art. 6(2). See also Dunn, supra note 170, at 130.
175 Id., art. 6(3). These factors include: output, productivity, utilization of ca-
pacity, inventories, market share, exports, wages, employment, domestic prices,
profits, and investment- None of these variables, either alone or in combination
with other factors, can necessarily give decisive guidance. Id.
176 Id., art. 6(9).
177 Id., art. 8(9).
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claim heard before the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body pursuant
to provisions under GATT.178
It is significant that the members came to an agreement over
the composition of the TMB only after much controversy. While
electing the chairman and ten representatives making up the
TMB,179 the importing and exporting countries both fiercely argued
for majority representationSO The result: half of the representa-
tives are from importing countries and the other half from export-
ing countries 1' As one author noted, this controversy could indi-
cate that representatives acknowledge the possibility that TMB
members would make politically based decisions,182 even though
the ATC provides that representatives must take a neutral position,
rather than performing duties for their governments. 83
Understandably, there has been concern on the part of devel-
oping countries in the Asia-Pacific region over the United States'
weak commitment to the ATC1&4 and alternatively, its strong ties to
special interest groups in the textile and apparel industries.83 s The
American Textile Manufacturers Institute, which represents the
U.S. textile industry, successfully lobbied Congress to specify that
restrictions under the ATC on import-sensitive products would be
the last targeted for integration into the GATT system.'8 6 Thus, the
17s See ATC, supra note 3, art 8(10); Dunn, supra note 170, at 132-33 (noting
that a Member could bring the dispute before the Dispute Settlement Body under
Article XXIII of GATT 1994).
179 See ATC, supra note 3, art. 8(1) ("The TMB shall consist of a Chairman and
10 members. Its membership will be balanced and broadly representative of the
Members and shall provide for rotation of its members at appropriate intervals.").
IS0 John Zarocostas, EU Blocks Compromise on Texhle-Quota Phascout, J.
COMMERCE, Jan. 12,1995, at 1A.
181 See Dunn, supra note 170, at 132 n.45; see also ATC, supra note 3, arL 8(1)
(TMB membership shall be "balanced and broadly representative of the Mem-
bers.").
182 See Dunn, supra note 170, at 132
183 See ATC, supra note 3, art. 8(1) (declaring that the members of the TMB
shall discharge their function on an ad personam basis).
184 See Dunn supra note 170, at 134. Under the ATC, there was no less protec-
tionist activity on the part of the United States than under the MFA, even though
the ATC was intended to liberalize trade in this sector. In fact, the United States
attempted to establish thirty new quotas (of which twenty-five were targeted at
WTO members) within the first twenty months of the ATC; by the end of the first
year of the ATC, the United States had more quotas than at the beginning of the
year. See id. at 136-37.
185 See, e.g., id. at 134-36.
Ms See id. at 134-35.
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United States plans to maintain fully 89% of its quotas on clothing
until 2005.187
In response to the U.S. textiles and apparel lobbies and its rep-
resentatives in Congress, wholesalers and retailers argue that the
U.S. textiles and apparel industry, by continuing to exert its influ-
ence to maintain trade restrictions, is foregoing potential benefits
that could be reaped by the movement towards trade liberalization
under the ATC,188 such as "the reduced costs of both domestic and
imported clothing, broader selection of available apparel products,
improved competitiveness both abroad and in the United States,
and the elimination of the welfare costs associated with MFA quo-
tas."189 Therefore, although the United States may have much to
gain from a more consistent move towards liberalization, it has
persisted in continuing its policy of trade restrictions, and, in some
recent cases, increasing barriers to trade.
Foreign textile and apparel importers, however, are not likely
to curtail their efforts at importation in response to U.S. trade
limitations. Indeed, the very nature of the MFA and the ATC,
which allows bilateral trade negotiations, as opposed to imposing
one rule restricting trade that applies equally to all members, per-
mits importers to relocate production to those areas that do not
face such limitations, such as Latin America and Russia. Through
these indirect means, the U.S. market remains open to the very
competition it has attempted to eliminate from abroad.
6. CASE STUDIES: JAPAN AND KOREA
As a result of the discriminatory restrictive quotas on textiles
and apparel imports under the MFA, exporting countries have de-
veloped investment strategies that permit them to relocate their
manufacturing processes to regions that are not subject to re-
straints on U.S. market entry. Thus, Korean and Japanese investors
have moved their manufacturing facilities from their respective
countries to regions such as Russia, Central America, and the Car-
ibbean Basin, which enjoy fewer restrictions on imports into the
187 See id. at 135; see also Gupta, supra note 16 ("While the existing ATC sched-
ule holds that 51 percent of the total volume of import of listed textiles and cloth-
ing be integrated into the WTO by January 2002, India is going to ask [at the WTO
Seattle Ministerial Meeting] for 83 percent integration within the same time
frame.").
188 See Dunn, supra note 170, at 135-36.
189 Id. at 136.
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U.S. market Significantly, the mobility of such investors and their
ability to circumvent the quantitative restraints under the MFA
poses the question of whether the United States and other import-
ing countries are indeed successful in maintaining the regime's
protectionist measures. It appears that the provisions of the MFA,
which do not establish import restrictions themselves, but instead
provide a framework of rules and procedures under which mem-
bers can impose quota restrictions, permit importing countries to
discriminate in their imposition of quotas on an exporter. There-
fore, while the United States may negotiate bilateral agreements
with Korea under the MFA in order to restrict Korean imports, if it
does not impose similar or more stringent restrictions on other
countries, Korean companies can relocate to these countriesso and
export their otherwise restricted goods to the United States without
sanction. The following case studies of Japanese and Korean in-
vestors illustrate the extent to which the application of import re-
straints under the MFA quotas by the United States has failed to
prevent market entry in the aggregate.
6.1. Japanese Textiles Producers Abroad as a Case Study on How the
MFA Impacts Exporters
Facing pressure from Europe and the United States to cut its
trade surplus, Japanese companies are diverting their investments
abroad where "they can take advantage of a combination of lower
labour costs, lower transport costs to local customers and access to
local markets that have import tariffs." 91 Foreign direct invest-
ment has increased in the global textiles and apparel industry since
World War II, a trend that can be explained in part by the persis-
tence of protectionist measures.192 In addition, Japanese companies
are reducing domestic production or shutting it down altogether.193
190 This assumes that there is no barrier to entry of direct investment into
these countries that are not subject to MFA restrictions.
191 Daniel Green, Hanging On by a Thread: Tariff Barriers and Lo Foreign La-
bour Costs are Driving Japanese Textile Production Offhore, Fi. T MEs, July 6,1993, at
19 See also JOHN SINGLEroN, THE WORLD TEXTILE INDUSTRY 113 (1997) ("Japanese
textile, synthetic fibre and clothing businesses were prominent in the race to es-
tablish factories overseas.").
192 See SINcLETON, supra note 191, at 113.
193 See Green, supra note 191. An example of a Japanese textile company in-
vesting abroad is Toyobo, which established several cloth-manufacturing joint
ventures in Malaysia, and, in 1993, cut Japanese output by 20% by suspending
production at ten of its factories for between four and eight days. See id. In addi-
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One study by the International Textile Manufacturers Institute
found that in 1992, textile production in Japan fell by sixteen per-
cent as a result of the shift from domestic production to investment
abroad.194
Japan's investment abroad seems long term. For example, the
Japanese government donated more than $12 million to Honduras
to improve highway and irrigation infrastructure.195 As one Japa-
nese diplomat in Costa Rica stated, "[t]he labor is cheap, the region
is close to the United States, and the region gets [Caribbean Basin
Initiative] privileges. This makes the region an attractive area for
continuing investment"1 96 Toray, Japan's biggest textile company,
has factories in Brazil, Central America, Malaysia, Thailand, and
Indonesia,197 as well as a joint venture in China.1 98
Thus, with the ability of firms to relocate to areas in which they
can receive preferential treatment, or at least not unfavorable
treatment, it is less clear that the trade restrictions authorized un-
der the MFA ultimately limit the entry of certain imports. Due to
the discriminatory component of these trade restrictions, whereby
Japan faces stringent restraints to the U.S. market and Central
America does not, investors can "shop around" for those regions
that will yield the highest return on their investment. Facing such
constraints on their ability to export, Japanese firms have increased
their foreign direct investment in regions that are not subject to
U.S. import quotas, and are thereby circumventing U.S. trade bar-
riers that were aimed at keeping their exports from reaching the
U.S. market
tion, Kanebo closed three of its five domestic cotton spinning and weaving mills
in 1993 for opportunities in China, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand. Finally,
Teijin reduced polyester output domestically, while investing $233.64 million in
Indonesia and Thailand in 1993; it also has factories in the Philippines, Thailand,
and Brazil. See id.
194 See id.
195 See Far East Investment in Central America Increases, Spurred on by U.S. Incen-
tives, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), 1615 (Nov. 6, 1991) [hereinafter Far East Invest-
ment].
196 Id.
197 DENNIS L. McNAMARA, TEXTILES AND INDUSTRIAL TRANSITION IN JAPAN 69
(1995).
198 See Green, supra note 191, at 19.
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6.2. Korean Textiles and Apparel Manufacturers as a Case Study on
How the MFA Impacts Exporters
6.2.1. Generally
For decades, Korean companies have been limited by strict U.S.
barriers to entry into textiles and apparel industry, and these re-
strictions have contributed to a diminution of Korea's textiles and
apparel exports to the United States. For example, between 1989
and 1991 exports from Korea to the United States that were subject
to MFA restrictions declined from 11% to 8.5%, a marked decline in
Korea's exports to the United States.19 On the other hand, Korean
investors have been able to take advantage of U.S. trade conces-
sions to certain areas, such as Latin America, the Caribbean Basin,
and Russia, by establishing export-oriented shops in those areas.700
For example, from 1986 to 1990, South Korean investors set up 140
industries in Central America and the Caribbean region from
which they exported $150 million in goods a year to the United
States. 201 In 1991, at $20 million, South Korea was the second larg-
est investor in Honduras behind the United States.202 Thus, the
success of Korean manufacturers suggests that despite U.S. efforts
to restrict and monitor imports, U.S. trade concessions in other re-
gions permit otherwise restricted entry into the U.S. market As
one South Korean investor in Guatemala City stated, "The trade
privileges offered [in] this area are much better than what I have at
home."203
6.2.2. Korean Investment in the Caribbean Basin
A study of Korean investment in the Caribbean Basin provides
further insight into the often discriminatory trade policies of the
United States, and serves as an example of how such policies do
not necessarily fulfill their goal of protecting the domestic mar-
ket 2°4 The Caribbean Basin Initiative ("CBr') was originally im-
199 See Robert W. McGee and Yeomin Yoon, Technical Flaws in the Application
of the U.S. Antidumping Law: Te Experience of U.S.-Korean Trade, 15 U. PA. J. IflfL
Bus. L 259,266 n.33 (1994).
200 See Far East Investment, supra note 195, at 1614.
201 See id.
202 See id.
203 Id.
204 See id.
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plemehted in 1983 under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery
Act.205 The CBI was a product of the United States' interest in en-
suring the stability of a region that was in a period of economic cri-
sis.206 Congress attributed the crisis to deeply rooted structural
problems, a huge balance of payment deficit, high unemployment,
and declining growth.207 Thus, the United States sought stabiliza-
tion through the CBI, which would reduce tariffs on exports to the
United States and increase investment in the Caribbean.208
Twenty-four Caribbean Basin countries are eligible for this special
treatment 209
Although the original intent of the CBI was to stabilize the
Caribbean economies, the CBI has in practice provided greater
benefits to Asian textile manufacturers than to those native to the
Caribbean Basin.210 Korea, Japan, and Taiwan have increased their
investment in Central America threefold since 1986.211 As one
author notes, the increased investment may be a result of both ris-
ing wages in Asia and the impact of U.S. quotas on Pacific Rim
products, coupled with duty-free or reduced-quota treatment
granted to certain products exported to the United States from the
Caribbean Basin under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery
205 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 384
(1983) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706 (Supp. 111990)).
206 The fact that the United States has an interest in the region demonstrates
the strong influence that domestic textile and apparel interest groups have on U.S.
trade policy, as well as U.S. willingness to engage in discriminatory practices.
U.S. apparel groups have supported extending trade benefits to the Caribbean Ba-
sin, on the theory that freer trade of textiles and apparel would encourage U.S.
apparel manufacturers to invest in the region, and thereby enhance their sourcing
options. Currently, U.S. apparel manufacturers are looking to invest in areas
closer to home where they can produce goods more cheaply, and thus be better
equipped to compete with imports from developing, low-wage countries. As one
representative of the American Apparel Manufacturers Association stated, "With
the phaseout of the MFA by the year 2005, we need all the tools we can [get] to
compete with China." Green, supra note 58, at 5A.
207 Legierski, supra note 78, at 307.
208 See id. at 308 (adding that the CBI has not been as advantageous to Carib-
bean Basin countries as was originally intended).
209 Far East Investment, supra note 195, at 1615.
210 See Legierski, supra note 78, at 307 n.13 (citing Far East Investment, supra
note 195, at 1615).
211 See Legierski, supra note 78, at 307 rn13.
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Act.212 Thus, the disparate treatment by the United States of the
two regions, as expressed through discriminatory trade policies,
has created the opportunity for Asian exporting countries to relo-
cate to areas that are subject to fewer restrictions.
6.2.3. Korean Investment in Russia
The number of Korean companies in Russia is growing as well.
These companies produce clothes that are eventually exported to
the United States and end up in stores like the Gap.213 Because Ko-
rean textile companies are subject to restrictions on imports to the
United States, and Russian imports of textiles and apparel are not,
Korean textile companies have seized upon the opportunity to ex-
port their products to an otherwise restricted U.S. marke 2 14 As
Charles Kernagen, director of the National Labor Committee, an
industry watchdog group, stated, "Through other countries such
as Russia you can enter the United States essentially through the
back door."215 Moreover, it is not likely that the United States
would object to such imports from Russia. One Commerce De-
partment official stated that the practice is legal as long as there is"substantial transformation" of the clothing in Russia, and that the
United States will not impose any serious quotas on Russia, as long
as the imports do not harm U.S. industry.21 6
Korean companies look abroad to find ways to circumvent im-
port restrictions on their products. For example, Joo In Ha, the
general director of Seoul-based Seishin Apparel Company, stated
that the Company bought and remodeled a bankrupt Soviet-era
clothing factory in the Russian town of Partizansk to expand sales
to the United States.217 Where some countries do not face quanti-
tative restrictions and others do, countries subject to such restric-
tions are able to relocate their manufacturing facilities to areas
where they are not subject to the restrictions. Case studies of Ko-
rean and Japanese manufacturers in Latin America and the Carib-
212 See id. (noting that increased Asian investment in the region, in addition to
being driven by U.S. quotas on Pacific Rim products, is in part due to increased
wages in Asian countries).
213 See Worling, supra note 18, at C1.
214 See id
215 I&
216 Id.
217 See id. The Russian subsidiary, Koruss, sold $1.68 million worth of sweat-
shirts, dresses, and polo shirts to Gap in 1998. Id.
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bean, and now of Korean manufacturers in Russia, demonstrate the
ability of exporters to relocate in order to avoid trade limitations.
Thus, if the aim of the U.S. quota system is to prevent the import of
highly competitive goods, then it is working neither effectively nor
efficiently.
7. U.S. QUOTAS ARE NOT NECESSARILY EFFECTIVE IN
PREVENTING IMPORTS OF TEXTILES AND APPAREL
7.1. Generally
From the outset, the MFA was a controversial derogation of
GATT principles. The original arrangement was fairly balanced,
and textiles trade was liberalized when compared to the system of
unilateral restraints that preceded it. However, each successive
Protocol extension to the MFA added features to permit developed
countries to increase restraints on the imports from the developing
exporting countries.218 The costs of increasing levels of protection-
ism are high and impose harms on not only the global economy,
but the domestic economy as well.
7.2. Costs of Protection on the Domestic Economy
Although proponents of protection would argue that trade re-
strictions are critical to the survival of the industry, trade restric-
tions ultimately cause the most harm to domestic consumers, who
bear the cost of protectionism. The MFA utilizes quotas, or quan-
titative restrictions, which result in higher prices on domestic con-
sumers than they would be paying on the world market.219 As one
author notes, "[t]hese types of restrictions reduce incentives for in-
dustries to operate efficiently and to develop new products and
technologies, thereby encouraging the concentration of resources
in the United States' least competitive industries." 220
According to Congressman Frenzel, in 1985, one estimate of the
extra cost to American consumers due to the MFA quotas would
amount to $4.4 billion per year.221 He cited another estimate by the
218 See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 422.
219 See CLNE, supra note 10, at 188-93.
220 See Landaw, supra note 1, at 223 (stating further that, in 1984, "special
protection (to all industries) cost U.S. consumers approximately $53 billion, in-
cluding an efficiency loss to the economy of about $8 billion.").
221 Textile and Apparel Protectionism: Hearings on H. 1239, 99th Cong. (1985).
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Consumers for World Trade organization, which placed the total
consumer cost of all textile protectionist laws and regulations at
over $18 billion per year.222 Another estimate of the consumer and
welfare costs of protection in the United States, based on 1936
wholesale values, is an annual cost of $20.3 billion, averaging $238
per household, or 0.72 of disposable income per household. 23 A
significant finding is that under MFA III, for example, the annual
cost of such protection to consumers was $27 billion. 224 Thus, as
the United States maintains quantitative restrictions on imports of
textiles and apparel, the cost of this protectionism is levied on its
own consumers.
Similarly, in Europe, the MFA had an adverse impact on the ef-
ficiency of its markets. As some scholars have asserted, "[t]he bi-
lateral quotas negotiated under the umbrella of the MFA arbitrarily
divide markets and prevent them from operating normally to allo-
cate resources efficiently among different activities and locations,
and to distribute goods efficiently among consumers in different
countries."225 Indeed, the inefficiencies arising from the mis-
allocation of products among consumers are a result of price dif-
ferentials in the segmented import markets, which arise from sepa-
rate quota restrictions on each market under the MFA regime.226
7.3. Cost of Protection to the Global Economy
The costs of protection of the textiles and apparel sector are
numerous, and not always economic. Indeed, there are political
costs that undermine the legitimacy of the ATC and MFA where
their adjudicatory roles are seen merely as representing the inter-
ests of the developed countries.22 7
First, the MFA has been criticized for harming developing
countries' economic stake in trade. By removing an entire trade
222 id.
223 See CLIE, supra note 10, at 193 (citations omitted).
224 See Landaw, supra note 1, at 223.
225 Riccardo Faini et al., A Primer on the MFA Maze, in BEYOND THE MULTFIBR
ARRANGEhENI. THIRD WORLD CoMPErrrION AND RsrRucrurrxc EuRoPE's TEXimE
INDUsTRY 27,27 (Giorgio Barba Navaretti et al eds., 1993).
226 See generally id. at 27 (discussing "potential sources of allocative ineffi-
ciency created by the MFA and [presenting] suggestive evidence of such ineffi-
ciencies .... ").
227 See, e.g., Dunn, supra note 170 (criticizing the Textiles Monitoring Board
("TMB") for extreme bias).
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First, the MFA has been criticized for harming developing
countries' economic stake in trade. By removing an entire trade
sector from the general rules of GATT, the MFA departed from
normal GATT rules in order to benefit a particular industry. Be-
cause of the heavy reliance of many developing countries on tex-
tiles trade for economic development, a great amount of their trade
is impacted by textiles protectionism. For example, in 1992, "tex-
tiles and apparel accounted for twenty to thirty percent of many
less developed countries' total merchandise exports. Of total ex-
ports, textiles/ apparel exports represented sixty-seven percent,
sixty-nine percent, and fifty-five percent in Bangladesh, Pakistan,
and Sri Lanka, respectively." 228
Second, critics point to the increasing discriminatory restraints
on developing exporting countries in direct contradiction to the
GATT principle of non-discrimination.229 While the original objec-
tive of the MFA was to liberalize imports from the developing
countries, the MFA became increasingly restrictive on exports from
these countries.230 In contrast to the U.S. treatment of developing
countries, a "gentlemen's agreement" existed between the Euro-
pean Community and the United States.231 Thus, although "the
MFA permitted the imposition of quotas on products from the de-
veloping countries, the United States and European Community
textile negotiators agreed in 1977 to refrain from imposing such re-
straints on each other's products." 232 The stated rationale for the
228 See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 422.
229 See, e.g., Kevin C. Kennedy, Reforming U.S. Trade Policy to Protect the Global
Environment: A Multilateral Approach, 18 HARV. ENvrrL L. REv. 185, 190 (1994)
(stating that GATT does not permit trade discrimination).
230 See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 422-23.
231 Id. at 423; see Giesse & Lewin, supra note 4, at 53 (noting that imports from
approximately forty countries, some of which are the poorest in the world, are
subject to restrictive U.S. quantitative restrictions on imports. However, "[in
sharp contrast, the United States grants imports from its West European suppliers
unfettered access to its market, while the European Community extends the same
favor to U.S. manufacturers."). To illustrate the disparate treatment of developing
countries and those of Western Europe by the United States, American imports of
fibers covered under the MFA increased by eight percent in 1985, but nearly half
of the increase was due to a twenty-seven percent jump in deliveries from West-
ern Europe, while imports from developing countries increased by only three per-
cent. See Tit for GATT, supra note 14.
232 Id. at 423.
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Third, The MFA has also been criticized for permitting quotas,
another departure from the general GATT principle of non-quantita-
tive restrictions on goods.234
Fourth, there has been criticism over the prolonged "tempo-
rary" protection, which has been in existence for over four dec-
ades. Although the original arrangement was intended to pro-
vide a temporary adjustment period for the textile and apparel
industries in the developed importing nations, this "temporary"
protection will have lasted more than forty years by the time the
MFA quotas are due to be eliminated.236 The protracted duration
of textile protectionism thus seems to belie its original intent
Fifth, the "market disruption" provision, which has been used
by the textiles and apparel industry to impose further quotas on
imports since the STA in 1961, and has been a "cornerstone of tex-
tile and apparel protection thereafter," has not been applied by
GATT to any other sectors.237 "Market disruption," which is de-
fined as "instances of sharp increases associated with low import
prices not attributable to dumping or foreign subsidies/'233 made
significant changes that transcended the GATT Article XIX transi-
tional safeguard mechanisn.2 9 The "market disruption" concept
permitted restrictions to be applied even in the absence of actual
injury and discriminatorily against individual countries responsi-
ble for the import surge, rather than according them MFN treat-
ment, in addition, "market disruption" permitted price differen-
tials between imports and comparable domestic products as a basis
24 Id.
235 See iL
236 IL.
237 CiNE, supra note 10, at 147.
223 MFA I, supra note 100, art. 3 (providing that the participating countries
may introduce new restrictions on trade in textile products or intensify existing
restrictions if the countries whose exports of such products are causing market
disruption). A determination of a situation of "market disruption" is "based on
the existence of serious damage to domestic producers or actual threat thereof."
Id. at Annex A(I). The factors causing market disruption include a "sharp and
substantial increase or imminent increase of imports of particular products from
particular sources. . ." and "these products are offered at prices substantially be-
low those prevailing for similar goods of comparable quality in the market of the
importing country." Id at Annex A(l). These prices are to be compared to the
price of the similar domestic product and to the prices that normally prevail for
such products under open market conditions by other exporting countries in the
importing country. Id. at Annex A(IH).
239 See supra text accompanying notes 173-78.
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ble for the import surge, rather than according them MFN treat-
ment; in addition, "market disruption" permitted price differen-
tials between imports and comparable domestic products as a basis
for establishing a need for protection, on the grounds that the
cheaper import was "disrupting" the domestic market.240 While
other sectors could have adopted the "market disruption" concept
to protect domestic markets, only the textiles and apparel sector
has adopted it.241
Finally, textile trade restraints have been criticized for engen-
dering ill will among trading partners that extends beyond textiles
trade issues. There has been retaliation in some cases, while others
have caused representatives of developing countries to question
the integrity of the developed countries.242
Despite economic, and even diplomatic, reasons for easing re-
strictions however, it appears that due to the influence of powerful
special interest groups that lobby for protection, the United States
continues to protect the textiles and apparel industry at a loss to its
consumers and the domestic and global economy.
8. CONCLUSION
The U.S. textiles and apparel industry has been protected for
far longer than was originally planned, due to political pressures
on the legislature from effective and well-organized lobbying
groups. Similarly, in Europe, domestic pressures on governments
have incited countries to pursue aggressively protectionist policies
and prevented them from moving towards GATT integration. As a
result, the MFA, which was intended to be only a temporary
measure, has become increasingly protectionist over the past sev-
eral decades, and neither the United States nor Europe has made
positive steps toward liberalization and convergence with the
GATT principles of MFN treatment and a general prohibition on
quantitative restrictions.
Aside from not preserving the integrity of the agreements,
however, is the more important concern that the United States and
Europe are upholding protectionist policies even in light of evi-
dence suggesting economic losses to importing countries, and an
erosion of credibility from the perspective of developing exporting
240 See CuNE, supra note 10, at 147.
241 See Dickerson, supra note 1, at 423.
242 Id. at 424; see supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
[22:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol22/iss2/5
2001] TOWARDS GATT INTEGRATION 419
countries that have heard too often that the agreements would be
"temporary."
Furthermore, it seems that the discriminatory arrangements are
themselves ill-equipped to prevent imports from entering U.S. and
European markets. Case studies of South Korean and Japanese
textiles and apparel exporters indicate that countries facing strict
limitations on imports can relocate to countries without such re-
strictions, and thus circumvent the complex system of quotas. The
studies also suggest that the current protection of the industry un-
der the MFA and ATC is not only ineffectual, since manufacturers
are able to relocate to countries where they can enjoy far fewer re-
strictions, but is harmful to both domestic market and global mar-
kets, where they create inefficiencies. Thus, the United States must
take positive steps toward liberalization prior to 2005, when the
MFA is scheduled to be dismantled, if it is to enhance its own
competitiveness in the global trading system.
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